People-centric sensing with smart phones can be used for large scale sensing of the physical world at low cost by leveraging the available sensors on the phones. However, the sensed data submitted by participants is not always reliable as they can submit false data to earn money without executing the actual task at the desired location. To address this problem, we propose ILR, a scheme in which we Improve the Location Reliability of mobile crowd sensed data with minimal human efforts. In this scheme, we bootstrap the trust in the system by first manually validating a small number of photos submitted by participants. Based on these validations, the location of these photos is assumed to be trusted. Second, we extend this location trust to colocated sensed data points found in the Bluetooth range of the devices that provided the validated photos. In addition, the scheme also helps to detect false location claims associated with sensed data. We applied ILR on data collected from our McSense prototype deployed on Android phones used by students on our campus and detected a significant percentage of the malicious users.
INTRODUCTION
Mobile sensors such as smart phones and vehicular systems represent a new type of geographically distributed sensing infrastructure that enables mobile people-centric sensing (Riva, 2007; Sensor Lab at Dartmouth, 2013; Urban Sensing at UCLA, 2013) . This new type of sensing can be a scalable and cost-effective alternative to deploying static wireless sensor networks for dense sensing coverage across large areas. Many clients can use this mobile people-centric sensing on demand and pay just for the actual usage (i.e., collected data). mCrowd (Yan, 2009 ) and Medusa (Ra, 2012) are some of the recent mobile crowd sensing platforms proposed to provide a common platform to perform any type of sensing tasks supported by the smart phone sensors.
Mobile crowd sensing can be used to enable a broad spectrum of applications, ranging from monitoring pollution or traffic in cities to epidemic disease monitoring or real-time reporting from disaster situations. While all of us could directly take advantage of such applications (e.g., real-time traffic monitoring), we believe that researchers in many fields of science and engineering as well as local, state, and federal agencies could greatly benefit from this new sensing infrastructure as they will have access to valuable data from the physical world.
Additionally, commercial organizations may be very interested in collecting mobile sensing data to learn more about customer behavior.
A major challenge for broader adoption of these sensing systems is that the sensed data submitted by the participants is not always reliable (Downs, 2010) as they can submit false data to earn money without executing the actual task. Clients need guarantees from the mobile crowd sensing system that the collected data is valid. Hence, it is very important to validate the sensed data. However, it is challenging to validate each and every sensed data point of each participant because sensing measurements are highly dependent on context. One approach to handle the issue is to validate the location associated with the sensed data point in order to achieve a certain degree of reliability on the sensed data.
Therefore, in this article we focus on validating the location data submitted by the participants. Still, we need to overcome a major challenge: How to validate the location of data points in a scalable and cost-effective way without help from the wireless carrier? Wireless carriers may not help with location validation for legal reasons related to user privacy or even commercial interests. To achieve reliability on participants' location data, there are a few traditional solutions such as using Trusted Platform Modules (TPM) (Trusted Platform Module, 2013) on smart phones or duplicating the tasks among multiple participants. However, these solutions cannot be used directly for a variety of reasons. For example, it is not cost-effective to have TPM modules on every smart phone, while task replication may not be feasible at some locations due to a lack of additional users there. Another solution is to verify location through the use of secure location verification mechanisms (Capkun, 2005; Capkun, 2006; Sastry, 2003; Talasila, 2010) in real time when the participant is trying to submit the sensing data location. Unfortunately, this solution requires infrastructure support and adds a very high overhead on user phones if it is applied for each sensed data point.
We propose ILR (Improving Location Reliability), a scheme in which we utilize participatory sensing itself to achieve data reliability. This scheme is based on location validation using photo tasks and expanding the trust to nearby data points using periodic Bluetooth scanning. In this scheme, the system asks the participants to execute a number of photo tasks at known locations. Then, these photos are manually or automatically (using image processing techniques) validated to ensure that they have been taken at the correct location (Ravi, 2006) .
The location and time details of these validated photo tasks will be our reference data points in the process of validating other data points collected nearby at the same time. The participants who generate reference data points become "Validators". Periodic Bluetooth scanning on each phone discovers other participants who are co-located with the Validators. ILR applies transitive closure and extends the trust from the Validators to data points collected by these participants. This transitive trust is extended until all co-located data points are trusted or no additional data points are found. ILR also detects false location claims by using these trusted data points. The major advantage of using the ILR compared to verifying location in real time is that our scheme does not require any overhead processing on the participant's phone when submitting sensed data, and thus it results in quicker data submission and has no impact on the phone's battery.
We evaluated ILR in the context of our McSense project (Cardone, 2013; McSense Project, 2013; . McSense is a crowd sensing system, and its sensing application is deployed in Google Play (Google play, 2013) to execute crowd sensing tasks for collecting photos, location, accelerometer, Bluetooth scans, and other phone sensing data. We collected data from over 50 users (students on our campus) during a two-month interval. Even though, Bluetooth scanning was executed rarely (as this was also a paid task), ILR was able to detect 40% of the users submitting photos from false locations; for ground truth validation, we manually inspected these photos.
These experimental results gave us confidence that ILR could work well in practice. To understand ILR's behavior at scale, when Bluetooth scans are done periodically by all participants, we ran simulations. The results demonstrate that ILR works well at various node densities and helps to detect false location claims based on a minimal number of validations.
In summary, we make the following contributions:
1. We propose ILR, a scheme which improves the location reliability of mobile crowd sensed data with minimal human efforts. The scheme also detects false location claims associated with the sensed data.
2. We evaluate the proposed scheme on real-world data by developing McSense, a mobile crowd sensing system which is deployed on the Android market, and by using McSense to conduct a field study and a user survey at the NJIT campus.
3. Based on security analysis and simulation results, we show that ILR works well at various node densities.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section "Motivation" presents motivating realworld scenarios, and section "Preliminaries" defines the assumptions and the adversarial model. Section "ILR Design" describes the ILR scheme and analyzes ILR's security. The implementation and experimental evaluation are presented in sections "Overview of McSense Implementation and Deployment" and "Simulations", respectively. In section "Field Study Insights and Improving the ILR Scheme", we discuss a number of lessons learned from our field study as well as potential improvements for ILR. Finally, sections "Related Work" and "Conclusions" discuss the existing literature in this area and conclude the article.
MOTIVATION
By leveraging smart phones, we can seamlessly collect sensing data from various groups of people at different locations using mobile crowd sensing. As the sensing tasks are associated with monetary incentives, participants may try to fool the mobile crowd sensing system to earn money. Therefore, there is a need for mechanisms to efficiently validate the collected data. In the following, we motivate the need for such a mechanism by presenting several scenarios involving malicious behavior. (Herrera, 2010; White, 2011) : Suppose that the Department of Transportation uses a mobile crowd sensing system to collect alerts from people driving on congested roads and then distributes the alerts to other drivers. In this way, drivers on the other roads can benefit from real-time traffic information. However, the system has to ensure the alert validity because malicious users may try to pro-actively divert the traffic on roads ahead in order to empty these roads for themselves. (Photo journalism, 2013; Toyama, 2003) : Citizens can report real-time data in the form of photos, video, and text from public events or disaster areas. In this way, realtime information from anywhere across the globe can be shared with the public as soon as the event happens. But, malicious users may try to earn easy money by claiming that an event is happening at a certain location while being somewhere else.
Traffic jam alerts

Citizen-journalism
Environment (Intel labs, 2010; Sensordrone, 2013) : Environment protection agencies can use pollution sensors installed in the phones to map with high accuracy the pollution zones around the country. The participants may claim "fake" pollution to hurt business competitors by submitting the sensed pollution data associated with false locations. Ultimately, location data validation is important in a mobile crowd sensing system to provide confidence to its clients who use the sensed data.
PRELIMINARIES
This section defines the interacting entities in our environment, the assumptions we make about the system, and the adversarial model.
Interacting entities
The entities in the system are:
 McSense: A centralized mobile crowd sensing system which receives sensing requests from clients and delivers them to providers; these entities are defined next.
 Client: The organization or group who is interested in collecting sensing data from smart phones using the mobile crowd sensing system.  Provider: A mobile user who participates in mobile crowd sensing to provide the sensing data requested by the client.
Assumptions
We consider that McSense posts tasks to collect sensing data on behalf of clients. Providers execute any available task and report the sensed data back to McSense, which delivers it to clients pending validation. We assume that every provider performs Bluetooth scans at each location where it is collecting sensing data. We also assume that the sensed data reported by providers for a given task always includes location, time, and a Bluetooth scan. Note that Bluetooth scans can have a much lower frequency than the sensor sampling frequency. In the context of this article, we use the terms "data point" and "task" interchangeably.
Adversarial Model
We assume all the mobile devices are capable of determining their location using GPS. We also assume McSense is trusted and the communication between mobile users and McSense is secure. In our threat model, we consider that any provider may act maliciously and may lie about their location.
A malicious provider can program the device to spoof a GPS location (Humphreys, 2008) and start providing wrong location data for all the crowd sensing data requested by clients.
Regarding this, we consider three threat scenarios, where 1) The provider does not submit the location and Bluetooth scan with a sensing data point; 2) The provider submits a Bluetooth scan associated with a sensing task, but claims a false location; 3) The provider submits both a false location and a fake Bluetooth scan associated with a sensing data point. In the "Security Analysis" section, we will discuss how these scenarios are addressed by ILR.
We do not consider colluding attack scenarios, where a malicious provider colludes with other providers to show that she is present in the Bluetooth co-location data of others. In practice, it is not easy for a malicious provider to employ another colluding user at each sensing location.
Additionally, these colluding attacks can be reduced by increasing the minimum node degree requirement in co-location data of each provider (i.e., a provider P must appear in the Bluetooth scans of at-least a minimum number of other providers at her claimed location and time).
Therefore, it becomes difficult for a malicious provider to create a false high node degree by colluding with real co-located people at a given location and time.
Finally, the other class of attacks that are out of scope for our current scheme are attacks in which a provider is able to "fool" the sensors to create false readings (e.g., using the flame of a lighter to create the false impression of a high temperature), but submits the right location and Bluetooth scan associated with this sensing task.
ILR DESIGN
In this section we present the ILR scheme which improves the location reliability of mobile crowd sensed data with minimal human efforts. We also describe the validation process used by
McSense to detect false location claims from malicious providers.
Before going into the details of the scheme, we assume that the sensed data is already collected by the McSense system from providers at different locations. However, this sensed data is awaiting validation before being sent to the clients who requested this data.
For ILR, we assume that the sensed data includes location, time, and a Bluetooth scan performed at the task's location and time. The main idea of our scheme is to corroborate data collected from manual (photo) tasks with co-location data from Bluetooth scans. We describe next an example of how ILR uses the photos and co-location data. Instead, McSense first considers the photo tasks with the highest node degree (NodeDegree) by examining the co-located groups for photo task providers who have seen the highest number of other providers in Bluetooth scans around them. In this example we consider NodeDegree ≥ 3.
An example of ILR in action
Hence, we see that photo tasks A, B, C, D, and G have discovered the highest number of providers around their location. Therefore, McSense chooses these 5 photo tasks for validation.
These selected photo tasks are validated either manually or automatically (we discuss this in detail in "The ILR Scheme -Phase 1" section). When validating these photo tasks, invalid photos are rejected and McSense ignores the Bluetooth scans associated with them. If the photo is valid, then McSense considers the location of the validated photo as trusted because the validated photo is actually taken from the physical location requested in the task. However, it is not always possible to categorize every photo as a valid or a fake photo. Therefore, some photos are categorized as "unknown" when a decision cannot be made.
In this example, we assume that these 5 selected photos are successfully validated through manual verification. Next, using the transitivity property, McSense extends the location trust of validated photos to other co-located providers' tasks which are found in the Bluetooth scans of the A, B, C, D, and G photo tasks. For example, A extends the trust to the tasks 1, 2, and 3, while B extends the trust to tasks 4, 5, and 6. Then, task 6 extends its trust to tasks 13 and 14. Finally, after the end of this process, McSense has 21 successfully validated tasks out of a total of 24 tasks. In this example, McSense required manual validation for just 5 photo tasks, but using the transitive trust property it was able to extend the trust to 16 additional tasks automatically. Only 3 tasks (E, F, and 12) are not validated as they lack co-location data around them.
ILR PHASES
The ILR scheme has two phases as shown in Figure 2 . "Phase 1: Photo Selection" elects the photo tasks to be validated. And "Phase 2: Transitive Trust" extends the trust to data points colocated with the tasks elected in Phase 1. Phase 1 -Photo Selection: Using collected data from the Bluetooth scans of providers, ILR constructs a connected graph of co-located data points for a given location and within a time interval t (these are the same groups represented in circles in the above example). From these graphs, we elect the photo tasks that have node degrees greater than a threshold (N th ).
These selected photo tasks are validated either by humans or by applying computer vision techniques. For manual validation, McSense could rely on other users recruited from Amazon MTurk (Amazon Mechanical Turk, 2013) for example. In order to apply computer vision techniques, first we need to collect ground truth photos to train image recognition algorithms.
One alternative is to have trusted people collect the ground truth photos. However, if the ground truth photos are collected through crowd sensing, then they have to be manually validated as well. Thus, reducing the number of photos that require manual validation is an important goal for both manual and automatic photo recognition. Once the validation is performed, the location of the validated photo task is now considered to be reliable because the validated photos have been verified to be taken from the physical location requested in the task. For simplicity, we will refer to the participants who contributed valid photo tasks with reliable location and time as "Validators".
Phase 2 -Transitive Trust: In this phase, we rely on the transitive property and extend the trust established in the Validator's location to other co-located data points. In short, if the photo is valid, the trust is extended to co-located data points found in Bluetooth scan of the validated photo task. In the current scheme, trust is extended until all co-located tasks are trusted or no other task is found; alternately, McSense can set a TTL (Time To Live) on extended trust.
The following two steps are performed in this phase:
Step 1: Mark co-located data points as trusted: For each task co-located with a validated photo task, mark the task's location as trusted.
Step 2: Repeat Step 1 for each newly validated task until all co-located tasks are trusted or no other task is found. 
if hasValidator(L, t) == TRUE then Validation Process
After executing the two phases of ILR, all the co-located data points are validated successfully. If any malicious provider falsely claims one of the validated task's location at the same time, then the false claim will be detected in the validation step. Executing the validation process shown in Algorithm 1 will help us to detect the wrong location claims around the already validated location data points. For instance, if we consider task 12 from Figure 1 as a malicious provider claiming a false location exactly at photo task A's location and time, then task 12 will be detected in the validationProcess() as it does not appear in the Bluetooth scans of photo task
A. In addition to the validation process, McSense also performs a basic spatio-temporal correlation check to ensure that the provider is not claiming a location at different places at same time.
Security Analysis
The goal of the ILR scheme is to establish the reliability of the sensed data by validating the claimed location of the data points. In addition, ILR seeks to detect false claims made by malicious participants.
ILR is able to handle all the three threat scenarios presented in our adversarial model section.
In the first threat scenario, when there is no location and Bluetooth scan submitted along with the sensed data, the sensed data of that task is rejected and the provider will not be paid by McSense.
In the second threat scenario, when a provider submits its Bluetooth discovery with a false location claim, ILR detects the provider in its neighbors' Bluetooth scans at a different location using the spatio-temporal correlation check and rejects the task's data.
Finally, when a provider submits a fake Bluetooth discovery with a false location claim, ILR looks for any validator around the claimed location and if it finds anyone, then the sensed data associated with the false location claim is rejected. But, if there is no validator around the claimed location, then the data point is categorized as "unknown".
As discussed in our adversarial model section, sensed data submitted by malicious colluding attackers could be filtered to a certain extent in McSense by setting the node degree threshold (N th ) to the minimum node degree requirement requested by the client.
OVERVIEW OF MCSENSE IMPLEMENTATION AND DEPLOYMENT
We implemented McSense to create a platform to deploy participatory sensing tasks in real time to campus students and other participants. We performed a field study at the NJIT campus in which, among other tasks, we deployed: 1) Photo tasks, 2) Automated Accelerometer and GPS sensing tasks, and 3) Automated Bluetooth sensing tasks. The server side Java code is deployed on the Glassfish Application Server which is an opensource application server.
Tasks Developed for McSense
The sensing tasks that we choose to develop for this study fall into two categories:
1) Manual tasks, e.g., photo tasks 2) Automated tasks, e.g., sensing tasks using accelerometer and GPS sensors; sensing tasks using Bluetooth.
Manual Photo Sensing Task: Registered users are asked to take photos from events on campus. Once the user captures a photo, she needs to click on the "Complete Task" button to upload the photo and to complete the task. Once the photo is successfully uploaded to the server, the task is considered successfully completed. These uploaded photos can be used by the university news department for their current news articles. On clicking the "Complete Task"
button, if the network is not available, the photo task is marked as completed and waiting for upload. This task is shown with a pending icon under completed tasks tab. Then a background service takes care of uploading the pending photos when the network becomes available. If a photo is uploaded to the server after the task expiration time, then the photo is useless for the client. Therefore, the task will be marked as "Unsuccessfully completed", and the user does not earn money for this task.
Automated Sensing Task using Accelerometer and GPS Sensors:
The accelerometer sensor readings and GPS location readings are collected at 1 minute intervals. The sensed data is collected along with the userID and timestamp, and it is stored into a file in the phone's internal storage which can be accessed only by the McSense application. This data is then uploaded to the application server on task completion (which consists of many data points).
Using the collected sensed data of accelerometer readings and GPS readings, we can identify user activities such as walking, running, driving, or user's important places. By observing the daily activities, we could find out how much exercise each student is getting daily and derive interesting statistics such as which department has the most active and healthy students.
Automated Sensing Task using Bluetooth Radio: In this automated sensing task, the user's Bluetooth radio is used to perform periodic (every 5mins) Bluetooth scans until the task expires; the task reports the discovered Bluetooth devices with their location back to the McSense server on its completion. The sensed data from Bluetooth scans can provide interesting social information such as how often McSense users are near to each other. Also, it can identify groups who are frequently together to determine the level of social interaction of certain people (Mardenfeld, 2010) .
To participate in the study, students have been asked to download the McSense application from the Android market and install it on their phones. On the application server, we periodically posted various tasks. Some tasks have a monetary value associated with the task which is paid on the task's successful completion; a few other tasks do not offer monetary incentives just to observe the participation of providers when collecting free sensing data. As tasks are submitted to the application server, they also appear on the phones where our application has been installed. Each task contains a task description, its duration, and a certain amount of money. The students use their phones to sign up to perform the task. Upon successful completion of the task, the students accumulate credits (payable in cash after the study terminated). We conducted the study for approximately 2 months.
EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION: FIELD STUDY
The providers (students shown in Table I 
Evaluating the ILR Scheme
The location data is mostly collected from the university campus (0.5 miles radius). The main goal of these experiments is to determine how efficiently can the ILR scheme help McSense validate the location data and detect false location claims. ILR considers the Bluetooth scans found within 5min interval of measuring the sensor readings for a sensing task.
Number of photo tasks Total photos 1784 Number of photos with Bluetooth scans (manually validated in ILR)
204
Trusted data points added by ILR 148 We were able to catch 4 users who claimed wrong locations to make money with fake photos, as shown in Table III . Since the total number of malicious users involved in the 16 fake photo tasks is 10, ILR was able to detect 40% of them. Finally, ILR is able to achieve this result by validating only 11% of the photos (i.e., 204 out of 1784).
The influence of the task price on data quality
In the field study performed at NJIT, a few tasks are posted with a high price (ranging from $2 -$10) to observe the impact on the sensing tasks. We have noticed a 15% increase in the task completion success rate for the high priced sensing tasks compared to the low priced sensing tasks. In addition, we have noticed an improvement in data quality for the high priced photo tasks, with clear and focused photos compared to the low priced photo tasks (the task priced with $1 or lower are considered low priced tasks). Thus, our study confirms that task pricing influences the data quality. This result confirms that various task pricing strategies (Lee, 2010) can be employed by McSense in parallel to the ILR scheme to ensure data quality for the sensing tasks.
SIMULATIONS
This section presents the evaluation of ILR using the NS-2 network simulator. The two main goals of the evaluation are: (1) Estimate the right percentage of photo tasks needed in Phase 1 to bootstrap the ILR scheme, and (2) Quantify the ability of ILR to detect false location claims at various node densities. 
Simulation Setup
The simulation setup parameters are presented in Table IV . Given a simulation area of 100m x 120m, the node degree (i.e., average number of neighbors per user) is slightly higher than 5. We varied the simulation area to achieve node degrees of 2, 3, and 4. We consider low walking speeds (i.e., 1m/sec) for collecting photos. In these simulations, we considered all tasks as photo tasks. A photo task is executed every minute by each node. Photo tasks are distributed evenly across all nodes. Photo tasks with false location claims are also distributed evenly across several malicious nodes. We assume the photo tasks in ILR's phase 1 are manually validated.
After executing the simulation scenarios described below, we collect each photo task's time, location, and Bluetooth scan. As per the simulation settings, we will have 120 completed photo tasks per node at the end of the simulation (i.e. 24,000 total photo tasks for 200 nodes). Over this collected data, we apply the ILR validation scheme to detect false location claims. Low count of malicious tasks submitted: When 10% of total photo tasks are submitting false location, Figure 4 shows that the ILR scheme can detect 55% of the false location claims just by using 10% of the total photo tasks validated in Phase 1. This figure also shows that in order to detect more false claims, more photos need to be manually validated: for example, ILR uses up to 40% of the total photo tasks in Phase 1 to detect 80% of the false location tasks. Finally, Figure 4 shows that increasing the percentage of validated photo tasks above 40% does not help much as the percentage of detected false tasks remains the same. High count of malicious tasks submitted: When 60% of the total photo tasks are submitting false locations, Figure 4 shows that ILR can still detect 35% of the false claims by using 10% of the total photo tasks in Phase 1. But in this case, ILR requires more validated photo tasks (70%) to catch 75% of the false claims. This is because by increasing the number of malicious tasks, the co-location data is reduced and therefore ILR cannot extend trust to more location claims in its Phase 2.
Simulation Results
Varying
Therefore, we conclude that the right percentage of photo tasks needed to bootstrap ILR is proportional to the expected false location claims (which can be predicted using the history of the users' participation).
Node density impact on ILR. In this set of experiments, we assume that 10% of the total photo tasks are submitting false locations.
In Figure 5 , we analyze the impact of node density on the ILR scheme. We seek to estimate the minimum node density required to achieve highly connected graphs to extend the location trust transitively to more co-located nodes. Low Density: When simulations are run with node density of 2, we can see that ILR can still detect 65% of the false location tasks using 50% of the total photo tasks in Phase 1. For this node density, even after increasing the number of validated photo tasks in Phase 1, the percentage of detected false claims does not increase. This is because there are fewer co-located users at low node densities.
Therefore, we conclude that ILR can efficiently detect false claims with a low number of manual validations, even for low node densities.
FIELD STUDY INSIGHTS AND IMPROVING THE ILR SCHEME
In this section, we present our insights from the analysis of the data collected from the field study and discuss possible improvements of the ILR scheme based on these insights. In addition, we present observations of the user survey that was collected from users at the end of the field study to understand the participants' opinion on location privacy and usage of phone resources.
Correlation of user earnings and fake photos
To understand the correlation between the user earnings and the number of fake photos submitted, we plot the data collected from the McSense crowd sensing field study. The experimental results in Figure 6 show that the users who submitted most of the fake photos are among the top 20 high earners (with an exception of 4 low earning users who submitted fake photo once or twice). This is an interesting observation that can be leveraged to improve the ILR scheme.
Figure 6: Correlation of Earnings and Fake Photos
In the current ILR scheme, there are cases where the validation process cannot make a firm decision on some data points. Those data points fall under the "Unknown" category as described in the "ILR Design" section. If these "Unknown" data points are too many (in millions), then it becomes challenging to validate all of them manually. Therefore, to improve the ILR scheme, we propose that these "Unknown" cases of data points must go through an extra check to find whether the user is a high earner in the sensing system. If the user is a high earner, then there is a high probability that the user submitted data point is fake. Those photos should be manually validated. If the user is a mid/low range earner, then there is a low probability of his/her data point being faked and the data point should be considered as valid. This method will help in reducing the number of photos that require manual validation.
Correlation of location and fake photos
We ask the question "Is there any correlation between the amount of time spent by users on campus and the number of submitted fake photos?" As suspected, the users who spent less time on campus have submitted more fake photos. This behavior can be observed in Figure 7 . Figure 7 shows the number of fake photos submitted by each user, with the users sorted by the total hours spent on the NJIT campus. The participants' total hours recorded at NJIT campus are the hours that are accumulated from the sensed data collected from "Automated Sensing task" described in the "Tasks Developed for McSense" section. The NJIT location is considered to be a circle with a radius of 0.5 miles. If the user is in circle, then she is considered to be at NJIT. For most of the submitted fake photos with the false location claim, the users claimed that they are at a campus location where the photo task is requested, but actually they are not frequent visitors on the campus. This is an interesting observation, which can also be leveraged to improve the ILR scheme's validation process when there is a large number of data points classified as "Unknown". The intuition behind this argument is that users tend to fake the data mostly when they are not around the task's location. Therefore, to improve the ILR scheme, we propose to use a user's recorded location trail in the McSense system in order to identify whether the user is or is not a frequent visitor of the task's location. If the user is not a frequent visitor of the claimed location, then there is a high probability that location claim is false and the "Unknown" data point should be manually checked. On the other hand, if the user is a frequent visitor of the claimed location, then her claim can be trusted. By reducing the number of photos that require manual validation,
McSense can improve ILR's validation process for "Unknown" data points.
Malicious user: menace or nuisance?
The photos submitted by malicious users are plotted in Figure 8 . The data show that malicious users have submitted good photos at a very high rate than compared to the fake photos.
These malicious users are among the high earners, so they are submitting more data than the average user. Thus, it may not be a good idea to remove the malicious users from the system as soon as they are caught cheating.
Figure 8. Photo counts of 17 cheating people
Instead, it may be a better idea to identify the validity of the individual data points (which is exactly the same process done in the current ILR scheme discussed in "ILR Design" section).
We conclude that the malicious users are not a significant menace, but may cause some confusion in the collected data. However, this can be filtered out by McSense through correlating the data with location and earnings as discussed earlier in the section.
Influence of maintaining a reputation score
When a fake location claim is detected by ILR, McSense would benefit if the malicious user who submitted the fake claim receives a lower compensation upon completion of a task. In order to perform such a process, McSense should use a reputation module such as in (Chu, 2010) , which maintains a trust score for each user. This is similar with many other systems which rely on the participation of users. The trust score varies between 0 and 1. Initially, the trust score is given a default value to every user, and it evolves depending on the user participation. The trust score is reduced when the user is caught providing fake data and is increased when the user submits good data.
We propose that the McSense system maintains a trust score for every user, and then it uses this score for calculating the user payment upon task completion. For example, for a completed task that is worth $5, a user with trust score 0.9 will be paid only $4.5. We envision that by maintaining a reputation score, the users providing fake data will eventually stop making false claims. We have seen earlier in the section that the malicious users also submit a significant amount of good data. But, if their trust score drops to 0, then the malicious users will not participate anymore as they do not earn the task amount and will eventually leave the system. As we argued earlier in this section, it is not a good idea to entirely remove the malicious users from the system. Therefore, to avoid eliminating malicious users from the system, the trust score will not decrease anymore after reaching a minimum threshold (e.g., 0.2). Hence, the malicious user will only get 20% of the task dollars until she improves her trust score. Therefore, the McSense system does not need to worry about discarding good data that is submitted by malicious users.
Users survey results and observations
At the end of the field study, we requested each user to fill a survey in order to understand the participants' opinion on location privacy and usage of phone resources. The survey contains 16 questions with answers on a five-point Likert scale (1="Strongly disagree", 2="Disagree", 3="Neutral", 4="Agree", 5="Strongly agree"). Out of 58 participants, 27 filled in the survey.
Based on the survey answers, we provide next a few interesting observations which are directly or indirectly relevant in the context of data reliability:
1. One of the survey questions was: "I tried to fool the system by providing photos from other locations than those specified in the tasks (the answer does not influence the payment)". By analyzing the responses for this specific question, we observe that only 23.5% of the malicious users admitted that they submitted the fake photos (4 admitted out of 17 malicious). This shows that the problem stated in the article on data reliability is real and it is important to validate the sensed data.
2. One survey question related to the user privacy was: "I was concerned about my privacy while participating in the user study". The survey results show that 78% of the users are not concerned about their privacy. This shows that many participants are willing to trade off their location privacy for paid tasks. The survey results are correlated with the collected McSense data points. We posted a few sensing tasks during weekends, which is considered to be private time for the participants who are mostly not in the campus at that time. We observe that 33% of the participants participated in the sensing and photo tasks, even when spending their personal time in the weekends. We conclude that the task price plays a crucial role (trading the user privacy) to collect quality sensing data from any location and time.
3. Another two survey questions are related to the usage of phone resources (e.g., battery)
by sensing tasks: 1) "Executing these tasks did not consume too much battery power (I did not need to re-charge the phone more often than once a day)"; 2) "I stopped the automatic tasks (resulting in incomplete tasks) when my battery was low". The responses to these questions are interesting. Most of the participants reported that they were carrying chargers to charge their phone battery as required while running the sensing tasks and were keeping their phone always ready to accept more sensing tasks. This proves that phone resources, such as battery, are not a big concern for continuously collecting sensing data from different users and locations. We describe next the battery consumption measurements in detail.
Battery consumption
We try to determine the amount of energy consumed by the user's phone battery for collecting sensing data that is required for ILR. Basically, ILR is executed on the server side over the collected data. But the collected data such as Bluetooth scans at each location is crucial for ILR. Next, we provide measurements for the extra battery usage caused by keeping Bluetooth/Wi-Fi radios ON. We measured the readings using "Motorola Droid 2" smart phones running Android OS 2.2.
 With Bluetooth and Wi-Fi radios ON, the battery life of the "Droid 2" phone is over 2 days (2 days and 11 hours).
 With Bluetooth OFF and Wi-Fi radio ON the battery life of the "Droid 2" phone is over 3 days (3 days and 15 hours).
 For every Bluetooth discovery the energy consumed is 5.428 Joules. The total capacity of the "Droid 2" phone battery is: 18.5KJ. Hence, over 3000 Bluetooth discoveries can be collected from different locations using a fully charged phone.
RELATED WORK
Although the idea of mobile people-centric sensing was introduced fairly recently, a lot of progress has already been made. MetroSense (Campbell, 2008) , Participatory Sensing (Burke, 2006) , and Urbanets (Riva, 2007) were among the first projects to demonstrate the feasibility of the idea. Recently, the Medusa framework (Ra, 2012) was proposed to provide a common platform to perform any type of sensing task supported by smart phone sensors. However, more research is required to provide guarantees to clients that the collected data is reliable.
Trusted hardware represented by the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) (Gilbert, 2011; Dua, 2009; Trusted Platform Module, 2013; Xu, 2011) has been leveraged to design new architectures for trustworthy software execution on mobile phones (McCune, 2008; Nauman, 2010; Schneider, 2011) . Recent work has also proposed architectures to ensure that the data sensed on mobile phones is trustworthy (Gilbert, 2010; Saroiu, 2010) . When untrusted client applications perform transformations on the sensed data, YouProve (Gilbert, 2011 ) is a system that combines a mobile device's trusted hardware with software in order to ensure the trustworthiness of these transformations and that the meaning of the source data is preserved. YouProve describes three alternatives to combine the trusted hardware with software: The first two require to extend the trusted codebase to include either the code for the transformations or the entire application, whereas the third one requires building trust in the code that verifies that transformations preserve the meaning of the source data.
Relying completely on TPM is insufficient to deal with attacks in which a provider is able to "fool" the sensors (e.g., using the flame of a lighter to create the false impression of a high temperature). Recently, there have also been reports of successful spoofing of civilian GPS signals (Humphreys, 2008) .
Task pricing also helps in improving the data quality which is an orthogonal work to ILR. A recent paper (Lee, 2010) presents pricing incentive mechanisms to achieve quality data in participatory sensing application. In this work, the participants are encouraged to participate in the sensing system through a reverse auction based on a dynamic pricing incentive mechanism in which users can sell their sensing data with their claimed bid price.
The LINK protocol (Talasila, 2010) was recently proposed for secure location verification without relying on location infrastructure support. LINK can provide stronger guarantees than ILR, but it has a number of drawbacks if used for mobile sensing. LINK requires a provider to establish Bluetooth connections with her co-located users at each sensing location, which increases latency and consumes more phone battery. In addition, LINK is executed in real-time to verify the users' locations, whereas ILR is executed on the collected data from mobile crowd sensing. Therefore, employing ILR helps providers in submitting sensed data quickly and also consumes less phone battery.
CONCLUSIONS
This article presents ILR, a scheme to increase the reliability of mobile crowd sensed data with minimal human efforts. ILR also detects false location claims associated with the sensed data.
Based on our security analysis and simulation results, we argue that ILR works well at various node densities. We evaluated the proposed scheme on real data, by developing McSense -a mobile crowd sensing system -which is deployed in the Android market. The analysis on sensed data collected from over 50 users during a two-month period demonstrate that ILR can efficiently achieve location data reliability and detect a significant percentage of false location claims.
